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"CONSENT WITHOUT CONSENT": REFLECTIONS ON THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY
NOAM CHOMSKY 1
The current moment is an opportune one to reflect on core issues of American
democracy The 1996 primary season is over, and the two presumed candidates
are heading on to the campaign itself. As always, the primaries had extensive
media coverage. There was also an unprecedented flow of funds, far more than
in 1992, though only one nomination was contested. But a few things were
missing, and these may be the most enlightening aspect of the primary season.
The first notable gap was voters. Apart from New Hampshire, where
one-fourth of the electorate took part, participation ranged from 3% to 11% in
the primaries that gave Robert Dole his victory, with about 1 million votes. The
scanty voting was carried out "with great haste - and not that much
deliberation," New York Times electoral analyst Richard Berke reported; and was
skewed toward the wealthy, as usual. Whatever may have been taking place,
it did not seem to be of much interest to the general population.
Also missing is much of a difference between the two presidential
candidates. Both are (in effect) moderate Republicans and longtime
government insiders, basically candidates of the business world. A few months
after Bill Clinton took office, the lead story in the Wall Street Journal reported
approvingly that the President is "Wooing, And Mostly Pleasing, Big-Business
Leaders." The story is headed "Unlikely Allies," but that is hardly a reflection
of Clinton's earlier record or campaign literature, as the news report tacitly
recognized. The Journal was pleased that "[o]n issue after issue, Mr. Clinton and
his administration come down on the same side as corporate America," eliciting
cheers from CEOs of major corporations, who are delighted that "[w]e're
getting along much better with this administration than we did with previous
ones," as one put it.
A year later, the Journal's enthusiasm was unabated. "The Clinton record is
surprisingly pro-business - and centrist," it reported with needless puzzlement.
With the help of congressional Republicans, the "special interests" have been
able to 'break him," gratifying the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, corporate
lobbyists, insurance firms, and the like. Only "some special interests have lost
out" with Democrats in control of both the Presidency and Congress: unions,
who had a "very sparse two years," the Washington Post reported, while
1 Institute Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT. What follows
is an edited and updated version of a lecture delivered on March 28, 1996.
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'business made out like a bandit," in achieving virtually all of its objectives
while blocking labor and progressives at every turn. 2
Aspirations rose several notches higher with the narrow electoral victory of
the Gingrich Republicans in November 1994. A year later, Business Week
reported that "most CEOs feel that the 104th Congress represents a milestone
for business: Never before have so many goodies been showered so
enthusiastically on America's entrepreneurs." The headline reads "BACK TO
THE TRENCHES" - appetites are unabated, and an interesting wish list
follows. 3 The message was sent to corporate lobbyists in Washington, whose
numbers reached 23,000 by the late '80s, up from 365 twenty-five years earlier.
The number of corporate lawyers expanded at the same rate, along with a huge
increase of other programs to overcome the "crisis of democracy" that arose in
the 1960s when sectors of the population that are expected to be passive and
obedient sought to enter the public arena.
With such allies, business had little time for the Clinton variety of support.
When Ron Brown died in a plane crash in April 1996, the Wall Street Journal
reported that "corporate America lost its most tireless and unabashed advocate
in the administration, one who made stumping for companies his trade-mark
mission." But though he "Worked Tirelessly for U.S. Industry," the headline
read, Brown "Got Little Support From Business in Return." Not surprisingly,
given the alternatives then available within the political system.4
In 1993, however, thebest that business leaders could find was someone who
consistently came down on their side. And in 1996 they have to satisfy
themselves with candidates located somewhere between an improvement over
Reagan-Bush and even more loyal service to corporate America.
The November 1993 Journal report on Clinton's surprisingly good behavior
was more nuanced than I just indicated. Like Democratic presidents generally,
it pointed out, Clinton tends "to appeal more to big corporations than to the
legions of small-business owners." The Journal was identifying a fault line that
has run through the U.S. political system for many years, separating more
capital intensive, high tech, internationally oriented business from other
sectors-roughly, the division represented by the Business Council and
Business Roundtable, on the one hand, and the U.S. Chambers of Commerce
and the National Association of Manufacturers, on the other. The latter are not
"small," quite often, but are somewhat different in character. The far-reaching
consensus of the business world has long set the general framework of the
2Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, As Clinton Is Derided as Flaming Liberal by GOP, His
Achievements Look Centrist and Pro-Business, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1994, at A12; Rick
Wartzman, Special Interests, With Backing of GOP, Defeat Numerous White House Efforts,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1994 at A12. David Broder & Michael Weiskopf, Finding New Friends
on the Hill, WASH. PosT NAT'L WKLY., Oct. 3-9, 1994.
3 Back To The Trenches, Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 1995, at 42.
4 Helene Cooper, Ron Brown Worked Tirelessly for U.S. Industry But Got Little Support
from Business in Return, WALL ST. J., April 5, 1996, at A10.
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political system, but there are internal divisions, this being one, a matter
illuminated particularly by Thomas Ferguson's important work.
5
Returning to the 1996 primary season, money and publicity were present in
abundance, but not voters or much difference in outcome. Public attitudes shed
further light on the functioning of the democratic system. More than 80% of
the public think that the government is "run for the benefit of the few and the
special interests, not the people," up from about 50% for similarly-worded
questions in earlier years. Over 80% believe that the economic system is
"inherently unfair," and that working people have too little say in what is going
on in the country. More than 70% feel that "[B]usiness has gained too much
power over too many aspects of American life" and "has benefited more than
consumers from government deregulation." Two-thirds say that the "American
dream" has become "harder to achieve" since the 1980s. And by what Business
Week calls "a stunning 95%-to-5% majority," the public believes that
corporations "should sometimes sacrifice some profit for the sake of making
things better for their workers and communities."
6
Such figures are rarely found in polls.
Public attitudes remain stubbornly social democratic in important respects,
as they have since the New Deal years.7 On the eve of the 1994 congressional
election, 60% of the public wanted social spending increased.8 A year later, 80%
held that "the federal government must protect the most vulnerable in society,
especially the poor and the elderly, by guaranteeing minimum living standards
and providing social benefits." Eighty to ninety percent of Americans support
(and a substantial majority of these "strongly" support) federal guarantees of
public assistance for those who cannot work, unemployment insurance,
subsidized prescription drugs and nursing home care for the elderly, a
minimum level of health care, and Social Security. Three-quarters support
federally guaranteed child care for low-income working mothers. Close to
two-thirds think that proposed Republican tax cuts "will go to people who
don't need it."9 The resilience of such attitudes is particularly striking in the
5 THOMAs FERGUSON, GOLDEN RULE: THE INVESTMENT THEORY OF PARTY
COMPETITION AND THE LOGIC OF MONEY-DRIVEN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1995).
6 Everett Carl Ladd, The 1994 Congressional Elections: The Postindustrial Realignment
Continues, POL. ScI. Q., vol.110.1, Spring 1995. John Dillin, Brown Refuses to Endorse
Clinton, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 14, 1992, at 2. Deer, Margolis, Mitchell, Bums &
Associates, BEING HEARD: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
prepared for AFL-CIO, March 21, 1994. America, Land of the Shaken, Bus. WK., March 11,
1996, at 64.
7 0n the early post-war period, see ELIZABETH FONES-WOLF, SELLING FREE ENTERPRISE
(1994). On the mid-'80s, see Vicente Navarro, The 1984 Election and the New Deal, SOCIAL
POLICY, Spring 1985; Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, The Myth of America's Turn to
the Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1986, and their RIGHT TURN (1986).
8Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 20,1994, cited by Doug Henwood The Raw Deal, NATION,
Dec. 12, 1994, at 711.
9 Portrait of a Skeptical Public, Bus. WK., Nov. 20, 1995, at 138.
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light of what people constantly hear, and are authoritatively told about
themselves.
The consistency between public attitudes and the record of the primaries
suggests some conclusions, not for the first time. But these are not the ones that
have regularly been drawn, for example, by the journal that reported in 1992
that 83% of the public think that the rich are getting richer, the poor are getting
poorer, and "the economic system is inherently unfair." The conclusion drawn
was that people are angry at "their well-paid politicians" and want more power
to the people, not more power to the government. That interpretation of
popular discontent with the economic system reflects two essential principles
that doctrinal institutions have labored to implant in the public mind. The first
is that government cannot be of, by, and for the people, responsive to their
interests and subject to their will and influence; rather, it is their adversary. The
second principle is that private power does not exist, even though the Fortune
500 control almost two-thirds of the domestic economy and much of the
international economy, with all that that entails.
In short, there is a conflict between the government, which is the enemy, and
the people, who are living the American dream together: the sober working
man, his loyal wife (now maybe with a job herself), the hard-working executive
toiling for the benefit of all, the friendly banker eager to lend money when
needed, all a model of harmony, their happy lives disrupted only by "outsiders"
and "un-Americans" of various sorts-union organizers and other rifraff. That
is the picture that has been diligently crafted by the Public Relations industry,
vastly expanded after the shock of popular organizing in the 1930s shattered
the belief that the end of history had been reached in a kind of utopia of the
masters. With some variants, the picture has endured in business propaganda,
the entertainment industry, and much of the popular and intellectual culture.
Given a picture of this general nature, the fact that the overwhelming
majority of the population regard the economic system as inherently unfair can
be understood to mean that people are angry at rich politicians and want the
government off their backs so that "the people" will have "the power," not their
enemy. The conclusion is not entirely wrong, after the propaganda onslaught
of the past years, on a scale that is rarely appreciated. And the conclusion even
makes some sense if we accept its tacit presuppositions: a democratic
government that serves popular interests is impossible (though state
governments are tolerable, being far more easily dominated by private power);
and the people live in harmony, contrary to beliefs about class conflict that
seemed obvious to Adam Smith and many since, and are an absolute obsession
of the American business community, which is unusual in its high level of class
consciousness and dedication to class warfare, quite openly expressed by
business leaders. They have long warned of "the hazard facing industrialists"
in "the newly realized political power of the masses," and the need to wage and
win "the everlasting battle for the minds of men" and "indoctrinate citizens with
the capitalist story" until "they are able to play back the story with remarkable
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fidelity"; and so on, in an impressive flow, accompanied by even more
impressive efforts, and surely one of the central themes of modem history.lO
It is a tribute to the skill of the warriors fighting the everlasting battle that
when the dam finally broke during the 1996 primaries, there was real surprise
and alarm at the appeal on class lines by a demagogue assuming a populist
mantle. Pat Buchanan "opened a second front" in the "class war," New York Times
commentator Jason DeParle reported. Before that, unhappy people were
expressing their anger and frustration by targeting "welfare families,
immigrants and beneficiaries of affirmative action." But now, they were
discovering bosses, managers, investors, speculators, even class conflict,
features of our harmonious society that had somehow escaped notice. 11
Ears that were tuned to a different part of the spectrum might have made
the discovery a few years earlier; say, in 1978, when UAW President Doug
Fraser condemned business leaders for having "chosen to wage a onesided
class war in this country-a war against working people, the unemployed, the
poor, the minorities, the very young and the very old, and even many in the
middle class of our society," and having "broken and discarded the fragile,
unwritten compact previously existing during a period of growth and
progress."12 Or 20 years before that, in the labor press when it still existed on a
substantial scale and was seeking-in its own words-to combat the corporate
offensive to "sell the American people on the virtues of big business," and to
provide "antidotes for the worst poisons of the kept press," the commercial
media, which have the task of "damning labor at every opportunity while
carefully glossing over the sins of the banking and industrial magnates who
really control the nation."13 And long before, back to the early days of the
industrial revolution.
We may be entering a new "blame era," Meg Greenfield warned in Newsweek,
with "a switch from a variety of other organized grievances and conflicts to a
developing economic class warfare theme ...." There is growing "animosity
towards the fat cats-the corporate executives and top-level managers and
investment bankers and other movers and shakers and dealmakers in the
burgeoning new business universe," where "many things are happening...
that only the specialist can understand." Those who cannot understand are
seeking "a new national heavy," someone to blame for their woes. That is
unfortunate, but understandable, Greenfield explains: misguided people
always look for "malign forces ... to explain their own failures and miseries,"
sometimes "Catholics and Jews and immigrants," now "the movers and shakers
and dealmakers" who are leading us to a new world. "So far, most Americans
1 0 ALEX CAREY, TAKING THE RisK OuT OF DEMOCRACY 24 (1995); FoNES-WOLF, supra
note 7 at 52, 177.
11Jason DeParle, Class is No longer a Four-letter Word, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 17, 1996,
at 40.
12 KIm MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALL 147 (1988).
13 FONES-WOLF, supra note 7 at 44-45, 117.
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have tended to blame Big Government for their economic woes," the editors of
Business Week add, 'but now their anger may be shifting in some measure
toward Big Business." Many are even challenging "the role of the corporation
in society." "Only the foolish would ignore the signs," and corporations must
consider "the need to be more responsible corporate citizens" if they are to
undercut the "reviving left." "The big reason why the bond and stock markets
have enjoyed such a heady run for the past 15 years has been capital's clear
subjugation of labor," John Liscio writes in Barron's, but the increasingly
"aggressive campaign" of workers "to secure a so-called 'living wage'," and
their occasional successes in this "sudden grassroots push for a guaranteed
bigger piece of the pie," can no longer be ignored. 14
There was still greater shock and distress at the discovery that the public
feels that the masters of the economy are not meeting their responsibility to
workers and communities, by a margin of almost 20 to 1. The reaction merits
some attention.
One should note carefully the range of options admitted into public
discourse now that the harmony of the past has been disrupted by the confused
and misguided public and cynical politicians. At one extreme of the broadened
spectrum of responsible debate it is held that those who rule the private
economy should ruthlessly seek profit, and at the other extreme, that they
should be more benevolent autocrats.
Missing from the spectrum are some other conceivable possibilities, for
example, the thoughts of Thomas Jefferson, who warned of the rise of a "single
and splendid government of an aristocracy, founded on banking institutions,
and moneyed incorporations," which would enable the few to be "riding and
ruling over the plundered ploughman and beggared yeomanry," destroying
democracy and restoring a form of absolutism if given free rein, as they later
were, beyond his worst nightmares. Or Alexis de Tocqueville, who, like
Jefferson and Adam Smith, regarded equality of condition as an important
feature of a free and just society. He saw the dangers of a "permanent inequality
of conditions" and an end to democracy if "the manufacturing aristocracy
which is growing up under our eyes," "one of the harshest that has ever existed
in the world," should escape its confines. Or America's leading twentieth
century social philosopher, John Dewey, who held that we cannot talk seriously
about democracy in a regime of private power. "Power today resides in control
of the means of production, exchange, publicity, transportation and
communication," he wrote. "Whoever owns them rules the life of the country,"
and politics is little more than the "the shadow cast on society by big business"
as long as the country is ruled by 'business for private profit through private
control of banking, land, industry, reinforced by command of the press, press
agents and other means of publicity and propaganda." To correct this
fundamental abuse of freedom and democracy, workers must be "the masters
14 Greenfield, Back to Class War, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1996, at 84; The Backlash Building
Against Business, Bus. WK., Feb. 19, 1996, at 102; Liscio, Is Inflation Tamed?, BARRON'S,
Apr. 15, 1996, at mw 10-11.
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of their own industrial fate," not mere tools rented by employers, a point of
view that traces back to the origins of classical liberalism. Until industry is
changed "from a feudalistic to a democratic social order," based on workers'
control, democratic forms may exist, but their substance will be limited.
15
Such ideas were also current in the labor press from the early days of
industrial development in the United States, as artisans, "factory girls," and
other working people gave eloquent voice to their struggle against "the New
Spirit of the Age: Gain Wealth, forgetting all but Self." They were struggling to
defend their dignity, freedom and culture, all under attack by the "harsh
manufacturing aristocracy." They did not plead with the aristocracy to be more
benevolent, but declared it to be illegitimate, denying its right to be harsh or
benevolent. They were denying its right to determine what happens in the
economic, social, and political realms. Like Dewey many years later, they
insisted that "they who work in the mills ought to own them," so that authentic
democracy can be envisaged. 16
All of this is "as American as apple pie," without the dubious benefit of
radical intellectuals, and an important part of the authentic history of the
United States. But it is all missing, even as the spectrum broadens to tolerate
the thought that the Fortune 500 should act more kindly to their subjects,
perhaps should be bribed by special tax concessions to restrain "corporate
greed," some of the more adventurous suggest.
Apart from its intrinsic illegitimacy, benevolent autocracy poses practical
problems. Those who run the game can always call it off, turning ruthless at
whim. There is an illuminating history of "welfare capitalism" initiated by the
masters to fend off the threat of democracy, then cancelled when it no longer
became convenient, or was no longer felt to be necessary, as once again in the
current era. The lessons should be no less obvious today than they were to
mill-hands in Eastern Massachusetts 150 years ago.
Let us return to the primaries, and take a closer look at what was missing.
One missing item was Senator Phil Gramm, whose "well-financed
campaign" was the first to die, political commentator James Perry reported in
the Wall Street Journal.17 Gramm's disappearance was particularly noteworthy,
Perry recognized, because he was "the only presidential standard-bearer" for
the "conservatives" whose "historic seizure" of power in 1994 was supposed to
reshape the political landscape for a long time to come, reversing the hated
social contract and restoring the glory days of the Gay '90s and Roaring '20s,
when "capital's clear subjugation of labor" had been established for good, so it
15 See CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION (1991), 106; DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, II, chap. 20 (1945), 161. On Dewey, see particularly ROBERT
WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1991).
16 NORMAN WARE, THE INDUSTRIAL WORKER 1840-1860 (1990).
17Perry, Notes From the Field, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1996, at A20.
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seemed, by methods that could not "proceed in anything remotely resembling
a democracy," Thomas Ferguson observes. 18
The collapse of the congressional Republicans is the "cruelest irony" of the
campaign, Perry continued. He was right to notice these interesting facts, but
they should have come as no surprise to anyone watching the polls, which have
consistently shown opposition to the programs of the Gingrich Republicans.
A few days later, Journal political commentator Albert Hunt observed that
"there barely was a mention of Newt Gingrich or the Contract with America,"
or other favorite themes of "Beltway economic conservatives," in the New
Hampshire primary campaign. 19 True, and again no surprise. In November
1994, few voters had even heard of the Contract, and when informed of its
features, considerable majorities voiced opposition. Not surprisingly, when
politicians had to face the public, they dropped their agenda like a hot potato;
or more accurately, dropped mention of it. That is no cruel irony, but simple
realism, as is the fact that the agenda is pursued as before, whatever the public
may prefer-at least as long as the "great beast," as Alexander Hamilton angrily
termed the "people" admired by democrats, can be kept quiet and caged. 20
Perhaps the most dramatic example of what was missing from the primaries
was the federal debt and deficit. "Nobody talks much about balancing the
budget any more," Perry reported, though it was the major issue a few weeks
earlier, repeatedly forcing the government to close as the two political parties
battled over whether the task should be accomplished in seven years or a bit
longer. All agreed with the President, who announced: "Let's be clear; of
course-of course-we need to balance the budget."21 But the topic
disappeared as soon as the public could no longer be entirely ignored. Or as
the Wall Street Journal preferred to phrase the matter, voters "have abandoned
their balanced-budget 'obsession"' - that is, their opposition to balancing the
budget by large margins, when informed of the consequences, as polls
regularly showed.22
To be accurate, parts of the public did share the "obsession" of both political
parties with balancing the budget. In August 1995, the deficit was chosen as
the country's most important problem by 5% of the population, ranking
alongside of homelessness.23 But the 5% who were obsessed with the budget
happened to include people who matter. "American business has spoken:
18Ferguson, supra note 5 at 72.
19 Albert R. Hunt, Politics & People: The Republicans' Crumbling High Ground, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 22, 1996, at A15.
20 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE
ADMINISTRATIONS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 61 (Literary Classics of the United States, Inc.
(1986)).
21Clinton Warns of Medicaid Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 1995, at 12.
22 Alan Murray, The Outlook: Deficit Politics: Is the Era Over?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1996,
at Al.
23 NYT/CBS News Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at4.
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balance the federal budget," Business Week announced, reporting a poll of senior
executives. 24 And when business speaks, so do the political class and the media,
which informed the public that "Americans voted for a balanced budget,"
detailing the required cuts in social spending pursuant to the public will (and
over its substantial opposition during the election and since, as polls regularly
showed).25
Small wonder that the topic fell off the screen when politicians had to face
the great beast. Or that the agenda continues to be implemented in its
interesting double-edged fashion, with unpopular cuts in social spending
alongside of increases in the Pentagon budget advocated by one out of six
people, but with strong business support in both cases. The reasons are easily
understood, particularly when we bear in mind the domestic role of the
Pentagon system: to transfer public funds to advanced sectors of industry, so
that Newt Gingrich's rich constituents, for example, can receive more federal
subsidies than any suburban district in the country outside the federal system
itself, protecting them from the rigors of the marketplace while their leader
denounces the nanny state and lauds entrepreneurial values and rugged
individualism.
The standard story from November 1994 has been that the Gingrich free
market enthusiasts are pursuing the poll-driven Contract with America. From
the beginning, it has been clear that this was untrue, and the fraud is now
partially conceded. In a press conference, Frank Luntz, polling specialist of the
Gingrich Republicans, explained that when he assured journalists that a
majority of Americans supported each of the ten parts of the Contract, what he
meant was that people liked the slogans that were used for packaging. To take
one example, studies of focus groups showed that the public opposes
dismantling the health system but wants to "preserve, protect and strengthen"
it "for the next generation." So dismantling is packaged as "a solution that
preserves and protects Medicare for seniors and that sets the stage for the baby
boomers" (Gingrich). Republicans will "preserve and protect" the health
system, Robert Dole added.26
All of this is very natural in a society that is, to an unusual degree,
business-run, with huge expenditures on marketing-$1 trillion a year,
one-sixth of 1992 GDP, according to a recent academic study, and mostly
tax-deductible, so that people pay for the privilege of being subjected to
manipulation of their attitudes and behavior.27 These are among the many
24 Business Week/Harris Executive Poll, Bus. WK., June 5, 1995, at 34.
25 A11 Things Considered (Nat'l Pub. Radio Broadcast, May 12, 1995).
26 Knight-Ridder, GOP Pollster Never Measured Popularity of 'Contract,' Only Slogans,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 12, 1995, at 11; Michael Weisakopf and David Maraniss,
Gingrich's War of Words, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY., Nov. 6-12, 1995, at 6.
2 7 MICHAEL DAWSON, THE CONsuMER TRAP: BIG BUSINESS MARKETING AND THE
FRUSTRATION OF PERSONAL LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945, Ph.D. Dissertation, U.
of Oregon, August 1995, Dawson, pc.
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devices that have taken shape to create artificial wants, manage attitudes, and
control "the public mind."
A manual of the public relations industry by one of its leading figures,
Edward Bernays, opens by observing that "The conscious and intelligent
manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an
important element in democratic society." "But clearly it is the intelligent
minorities which need to make use of propaganda continuously and
systematically," because it is only they, "a trifling fraction" of the population,
"who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses" and
are therefore in a position to "pull the wires which control the public mind." In
its commitment to "open competition" that will "function with reasonable
smoothness," our "society has consented to permit free competition to be
organized by leadership and propaganda," a "mechanism which controls the
public mind" and enables the intelligent minorities "so to mold the mind of the
masses that they will throw their newly gained strength in the desired
direction," thus "regimenting the public mind every bit as much as an army
regiments the bodies of its soldiers."28 This process of "engineering consent" is
the very "essence of the democratic process," Bernays wrote 20 years later,
shortly before he was honored for his contributions by the American
Psychological Association in 1949.
A good Roosevelt liberal, Bernays had honed his skills in Woodrow Wilson's
Committee on Public Information (Creel Commission), the first U.S. state
propaganda agency. "It was, of course, the astounding success of propaganda
during the war that opened the eyes of the intelligent few in all departments
of life to the possibilities of regimenting the public mind," Bernays explained
in his PR manual on propaganda. The Commission was the official component
of the campaign in which intellectuals undertook to serve as "the faithful and
helpful interpreters of what seems to be one of the greatest enterprises ever
undertaken by an American president" (New Republic), Wilson's decision to
enter the European war after campaigning on the slogan of peace without
victory. Their achievement, as they later put it, was to "impose their will upon
a reluctant or indifferent majority," with the aid of propaganda fabrications
about Hun atrocities and other such devices, serving unwittingly as
instruments of the British Ministry of Information, which secretly defined its
task as "to direct the thought of most of the world."
All of this is good Wilsonian doctrine. Wilson's own view was that an elite
of gentlemen with "elevated ideals" is needed to preserve "stability and
righteousness."29 It is the intelligent minority of "responsible men" who must
control decision-making, another veteran of the Creel Commission, Walter
Lippmann, explained in his influential essays on democracy of the same years.
This "specialized class" of "public men" is responsible for "the formation of a
sound public opinion" as well as setting policy, and must keep at bay the
2 8 EDWARD L. BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA (1928).
29 David S. Fogelsang, AMERICA'S SECRET WAR AGAINST BOLSHEviSM 28 (1995).
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"ignorant and meddlesome outsiders," who are incapable of dealing "with the
substance of the problem." The public must 'be put in its place": its "function"
in a democracy is to be "spectators of action," not participants, acting "only by
aligning itself as the partisan of someone in a position to act executively," in
periodic electoral exercises.
In the entry on "propaganda" in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Harold
Lasswell, one of the founders of modem political science, warned that the
intelligent few must recognize the "ignorance and stupidity [of] ... the masses"
and not succumb to "democratic dogmatisms about men being the best judges
of their own interests." The masses must be controlled for their own good; and
in more democratic societies, where social managers lack the requisite force,
they must turn to "a whole new technique of control," largely through
propaganda.
There is, of course, a hidden premise: the "intelligent minorities" must be
intelligent enough to understand where real power lies, unlike, say, Eugene
Debs, languishing in jail because he failed to recognize the nobility of Wilson's
great enterprise. Years earlier, Debs had been declared "an enemy of the human
race" by the New York Times, which demanded that "the disorder his bad
teachings has engendered must be squelched," as indeed it was, in what
historian David Montgomery describes as "a most undemocratic America" that
was "created over its workers' protests."30
The themes resonate to the current period, for example, when the Professor
of the Science of Government at Harvard explained at the outset of the Reagan
years that "you may have to sell [intervention or other military action] in such
a way as to create the misimpression that it is the Soviet Union that you are
fighting. That is what the United States has been doing ever since the Truman
Doctrine."31 It is not only the resort to violence that must be "sold" to a reluctant
public. Their "function" also extends to assuming the costs and risks of "free
enterprise." These responsibilities of the public took new forms after World War
II, when the business world recognized that advanced industry "cannot
satisfactorily exist in a pure, competitive, unsubsidized, 'free enterprise'
economy," and that "the government is their only possible savior" (Fortune,
Business Week). Business leaders recognized that the needed economic stimulus
could take other forms, but the Pentagon system had many advantages over
social spending, with its unwelcome democratizing and redistributive effects;
and it took little imagination to see that the public could be kept in line by
"creating misimpressions" about the Cold War. Understanding the point well,
Truman's Air Force Secretary advised that the word to use is "security," not
"subsidy," when it becomes necessary to induce the ignorant and meddlesome
outsiders to permit the savior to socialize coats and risks. Virtually every
30 PATRICIA CAYO SEXTON, THE WAR ON LABOR AND THE LEFT 112 (1991); DAVID
MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 7 (1987).
31Samuel Huntington, Vietnam Reappraised, 6.1 INT'L SECuRITY, 14 (Summer 1981).
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dynamic sector of the advanced industrial economy has relied on such
measures.32
The lessons were also understood by the Reaganites, who broke new
postwar records in protectionism and sharply expanded the public subsidy to
advanced industry in the standard postwar fashion. And they are surely
understood today by the Heritage Foundation, Gingrich, and others who
preach the merits of market discipline to 7-year old children while increasing
the Pentagon budget beyond its current Cold War levels, no longer because the
Russians are on the march but because of a new threat that emerged when the
former enemy became a subordinate ally, even contributing to U.S. weapons
production. The Pentagon must remain huge because of the "growing
technological sophistication of Third World conflicts," the Bush administration
explained to Congress a few months after the Berlin wall fell, adding that it
would also be necessary to strengthen "the defense industrial base" with
incentives "to invest in new facilities and equipment as well as in research and
development."
Shortly after, the administration greatly expanded the flow of U.S. arms to
the Third World, thus enhancing the threat that had arisen just in time to replace
John F. Kennedy's "monolithic and ruthless conspiracy." The Clinton
administration took matters a step further, determining for the first time that
policy will "factor the health of U.S. weapons makers and the shape of the
domestic economy into decisions on whether to approve foreign arms sales,"
the press reported; a natural step, now that the Soviet pretext has collapsed and
it becomes necessary to face the facts more honestly.
Arms sales to undemocratic countries-a substantial component, even
under the most generous interpretation of "democracy"-are opposed by 96%
of the population. Military spending is often portrayed as a "jobs program, but
the public seems unconvinced, or perhaps is not entirely unaware that the term
jobs has come to mean profits in the "new techniques of control of the public
mind."33
The problem of safeguarding "stability and righteousness" has been no less
grave abroad. Consider Brazil, recognized to be the potential "Colossus of the
South" from early in this century, and taken over by the United States in 1945
to be turned into a "testing area for modem scientific methods of industrial
development," as Washington "assumed, out of self-interest, responsibility for
the welfare of the world capitalist system."34 On a visit to Brazil in 1960,
President Eisenhower assured an audience of half a million that "Our socially
conscious private-enterprise system benefits all the people, owners and
3 2 See FRANK RoFsKY, HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE WAR SCARE OF 1948 (1993); NOAM
CHOMSKY, TURNING THE TIDE (1985); NOAM CHOMSKY, WORLD ORDERS, OLD AND NEW
(1994).
33 Eyal Press, GOP 'Responsibility' On US Arms Sales, CHRIsTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb.
23, 1995, at 19.
3 4 GERALD HAINEs, THE AMERICANIZATION OF BRAZIL, ix, 121 (1989).
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workers like... In freedom the Brazilian worker is happily demonstrating the
joys of life under a democratic system." The U.S. had broken "down the old
order in South America," Eisenhower's Ambassador John Cabot Moors told an
audience in Rio de Janeiro a few months earlier, introducing "such
revolutionary ideas as free compulsory education, equality before the law, a
relatively classless society, a responsible democratic system of government, free
competitive enterprise, [and] a fabulous standard of living for the masses."
But Brazilians were unappreciative of their good fortune, and reacted
harshly to the good news brought by their northern tutors. Latin American
elites are "like children," Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed the
National Security Council, "with practically no capacity for self-government."
Worse still, the U.S. is "hopelessly far behind the Soviets in developing controls
over the minds and emotions of unsophisticated peoples."35 A few weeks later
Dulles again expressed his anxiety over the Communist "ability to get control
of mass movements, . . something we have no capacity to duplicate." "The
poor people are the ones they appeal to and they have always wanted to
plunder the rich."36 Soon after, Washington had to turn to sterner measures to
maintain stability and righteousness.
Responsible men who try to bring democracy to the children of the world
face no easy task, and it is therefore not surprising that Washington's "impulse
to promote democracy" is generally ineffective, and often limited to rhetoric
(Thomas Carothers, surveying Washington's crusade for democracy under
Reagan, which he regards as "sincere" though largely a failure). The "democracy
assistance projects" of the Reagan administration (which Carothers reviews
with "an insider's perspective," having served in the Office of the Legal Adviser
of the Department of State from 1985 to 1988) sought to maintain "the basic
order of what, historically at least, are quite undemocratic societies" and to
avoid "populist-based change" that might risk "upsetting established economic
and political orders and heading off in a leftist direction." The U.S. continued
"to adopt prodemocracy policies as a means of relieving pressure for more
radical change" - much as "welfare capitalism" and democratic reforms were
reluctantly accepted at home-"but inevitably sought only limited, top-down
forms of democratic change that did not risk upsetting the traditional
structures of power with which the United States has long been allied." The
word "inevitable" is too strong, but the policies are natural, expected, and
routine, and consistent with prevailing conceptions of democracy. Nor is it
particularly surprising that progress towards democracy was negatively
correlated with U.S. influence, as Carothers indicates. 37
35Stephen Streeter, Campaigning Against Latin American Nationalism, THE AMERICAS
193-218 (1994), (citing report to the N.S.C., May 21, 1958).
36 John Foster Dulles, Telephone Call to Allen Dulles, "Minutes of telephone
conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter," June 19, 1958 (Eisenhower
Library, Abilene KA).
37Thomas Carothers, The Reagan Years: the 1980s, in Abraham Lowenthal, ed.,
EXPORTING DEMOCRACY 90-122 (1991); Thomas Carothers, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY
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Similar problems have arisen with international institutions. In its early
years, the United Nations was a reliable instrument of U.S. policy, for obvious
reasons, and was highly admired. But decolonization brought with it what
came to be called "the tyranny of the majority," and from the 1960s, Washington
was compelled to take the lead in vetoing Security Council resolutions (with
Britain second, and France a distant third), and voting alone or with a few client
states against General Assembly resolutions. The U.N. fell into disfavor, and
there was no little perplexity over the fact that the U.N. is opposing the U.S.
(not conversely), with Washington no longer assured of "an automatic
majority" (New York Times U.N. correspondent Richard Bernstein, who
attributes the deterioration of international norms to "the very structure and
political culture" of the U.N. and the lack of diplomatic skills among
Americans). 38
By the 1980s, the U.S. had to withdraw its acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction by the World Court for similar reasons. State Department Legal
Adviser Abraham Sofaer explained that when the U.S. accepted such
jurisdiction, most members of the U.N. "were aligned with the United States
and shared its views regarding world order." But no longer. Now "[a] great
many of these cannot be counted on to share our view of the original
constitutional conception of the U.N. Charter," and "[t]his same majority often
opposes the United States on important international questions." We must
therefore "reserve to ourselves the power to determine whether the Court has
jurisdiction over us in a particular case," in accord with the Connally
reservation of 1946 which "provides that the United States does not accept
compulsory jurisdiction over any dispute involving matters essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States, as determined by the United
States"-in this case, the U.S. actions against Nicaragua that were later
condemned by the Court as an "unlawful use of force. "39
A domestic analogue is noted by the President of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Robert Fogelnest. Discussing a California
initiative to allow non-unanimous jury verdicts, he quotes representatives of
the California District Attorneys Association who "have decried an alleged
growth in the 'lack of social consensus' and cited 'differences in the
community"' as justification for this step. What has changed, Fogelnest
suggests, "is that women, people of color, immigrants, gay people, political
dissidents, and even lawyers now proudly serve on juries as never before."40
On this analysis, the reasoning is much the same as with regard to international
institutions and challenges to "the traditional structure of power" generally: if
249 (1991).
38 Richard Bernstein, The U.N. versus the U.S., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 22, 1984, at 18.
39 The United States and the World Court, U.S. DEP'T STATE, BUREAU PUB. AFF., CURRENT
PoLICY, No. 769 (Dec. 1985), statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
I am indebted to Tayyab Mahmud for bringing this to my attention.
40Robert Fogelnest, President's Column, THE CHAMPION, March 1996, at 5.
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they do not preserve "stability and righteousness," democratic practices must
yield.
At home and abroad, all of this too is "as American as apple pie." The basic
point was explained cogently by sociologist Franklin Henry Giddings when
the U.S. was liberating the Philippines at the turn of the century, also liberating
several hundred thousandsouls from life's sorrows and travails - or as the press
put it, "slaughtering the natives in English fashion" so that "the misguided
creatures" who resist us will at least "respect our arms" and later come to
recognize that we wish them "liberty" and "happiness," at least those who
survive the "wholesale killing" they are forcing us to undertake.
To explain all of this in properly civilized tones, Giddings devised the
concept "consent without consent": "if in later years, [the colonized] see and
admit that the disputed relation was for the highest interest, it may be
reasonably held that authority has been imposed with the consent of the
governed," rather as when a parent prevents a child from running into a busy
street.41
A version of this useful concept has also been adopted by the courts. Thus,
denying an appeal by workers who lost jobs when Ohio plants were moved to
states with cheaper labor, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "[Sitates
and counties in the United States compete with each other for companies
contemplating relocation," and labor laws neither "discourage such
relocations" nor bar closing of unionized plants in favor of "a nonunion plant
in another part of the country or in a foreign country," as "contemplated" by
NAFTA. Furthermore, Congress and the courts
have made the social judgment, rightly or wrongly, that our capitalistic
system, Darwinian though it may be, will not discourage companies
from locating on the basis of their own calculations of factors relating
to efficiency and competitiveness. The rules of the marketplace govern.
By so reflecting commercial interests, the institutions of government
serve-according to current legal and economic theory-the long-term
best interests of society as a whole. That is the basic social policy the
country has opted to follow.
4 2
"The country has opted to follow" no such course, unless we invoke the
people's "consent without consent." And it is far from true that "the rules of the
marketplace govern" or that the system is "Darwinian" (in the intended sense
of "social Darwinism," which has little to do with biology)-except for working
people, the poor and the weak, who are indeed subjected to the social policy
established by Congress and the courts, operating under the Deweyan
"shadow," and might have some thoughts on the historic dedication of "legal
and economic theory" to "the long-term best interests of society as a whole."
4 1 STUART CHREIGHTON MILLER, BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION 74, 78,123 (1982).
42 Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 1994).
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With a proper understanding of the concept of "consent," then, we may
conclude that implementation of the business agenda over the objections of the
general public is "with the consent of the governed," a form of "consent without
consent." And in the same sense, "society has consented" to grant to "leadership
and propaganda" the authority to "mold the mind of the masses" so that they
will perform their duties in our free society as do soldiers in a properly
disciplined army. It is the hard and demanding task of the responsible men to
present a suitable version of this to the "ignorant and meddlesome outsiders,"
particularly when the public is called upon to carry out its periodic task of
"aligning itself as the partisan" of one or another of those who understand "the
higher interest." Within the political system, that is; not in the governance of
the economy, which must remain securely in the hands of virtually
unaccountable power systems.
There has often been a gap between public preferences and public policy. In
recent years, the gap has become substantial, as changes in the international
economy have rendered superfluous the gestures of the benevolent aristocracy
towards "welfare capitalism," or so it was believed until ominous signs of a
"second front in the class war" were detected in early 1996.
The problem of obtaining "consent without consent" did not arise for the first
time in modern America. David Hume, in his First Principles of Government,
concluded that in any society, "the governors have nothing to support them but
opinion. 'Tis therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this
maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well
as to the most free and most popular." The more popular, however, require more
sophisticated measures to control the public mind, as Lasswell and others have
recognized, including some gestures to the principle of "consent of the
governed." Frances Hutcheson had argued that this principle is not violated
when rulers impose a sensible plan that is rejected by the "stupid" and
"prejudiced" people, as long as there is "all rational ground of concluding, that
upon a short tryal [the people] will heartily consent to it,"43 so that they offer
their "consent without consent."
The people, however, are often recalcitrant, posing repeated "crises of
democracy." The problem of containing the threat of democracy had arisen a
century before Hume and Hutcheson, during the first democratic upsurge,
when the rabble did not want to be ruled by King or Parliament but 'by
countrymen like ourselves, that know our wants," their pamphlets explained,
because "[iut will never be a good world while knights and gentlemen make us
laws, that are chosen for fear and do but oppress us, and do not know the
people's sores." Such ideas reappear constantly through modern history,44
distressing the responsible men just as they did "the men of best quality" of 18th
4 3 HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY; Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and
"Liberty": their Original Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance In the
Debate over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REv. 644, (1994) Feb. 1994, 644. (citing FRANCES
HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 231 (August M. Kelley 1968) (1955)).
44 See GORDON WOOD, THE RADICAuSM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 245 (1991).
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century England, who were ready to grant the people rights, one explained,
but within reason, and on the principle that "when we mention the people, we
do not mean the confused promiscuous body of the people." A century later,
John Randolph was to repeat the sentiment in almost the same words, stating:
"When I mention the public, ... I mean to include only the rational part of it.
The ignorant vulgar are as unfit to judge of the modes, as they are unable to
manage the reins of government."45
Though not unique, the American experience is surely the most interesting
and most important case to study carefully if we hope to understand the world
of today and tomorrow. One reason is the power and primacy of the United
States. Another is its stable and longstanding democratic institutions.
Furthermore, the United States is about as close to a tabula rasa as one can find.
America can be "[als happy as she pleases," Thomas Paine remarked in 1776:
"she hath a blank sheet to write upon." The indigenous societies were largely
eliminated. By comparative standards, the U.S. also has little residue of earlier
European structures or an authentic conservative tradition, one reason,
perhaps, for the relative weakness of the social contract and of support systems,
which often had their roots in pre-capitalist institutions. And to an unusual
extent, the socio-political order was consciously designed. In studying history,
one cannot construct experiments, but the U.S. is as close to the "ideal case" of
state capitalist democracy as can be found.
The main designer, furthermore, was not only an astute political thinker but
also a very lucid one, whose views largely prevailed, and have received careful
scholarly attention (with diverse conclusions).46 While eloquently upholding
the call for "preservation of the sacred fire of liberty" that he wrote into George
Washington's Inaugural Address, James Madison also echoed and reshaped
the concerns that have guided the thinking of the responsible men throughout
the modem democratic era. In the debates on the Federal Constitution, he
pointed out that "[iun England, at this day, if elections were open to all classes
of people, the property of landed proprietors would be insecure. An agrarian
law would soon take place," undermining the right to property. To ward off
such injustice, "our government ought to secure the permanent interests of the
country against innovation," arranging voting patterns and checks and
balances so as "to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority."47
In Madison's "determination to protect minorities against majority
infringements of their rights," Lance Banning observes, "it is absolutely clear
4 5James Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, BYU L. REV.
1055 (1993) (quoting JOHN RANDOLPH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF
VIRGINIA (1774)).
46Important recent studies include JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); RICHARD MATTHEWS, IF MEN WERE
ANGELS (1995); LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY (1995).
4 7 JONATHAN ELLIOT, Yates's Minutes, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 45 (Lippincott 2d ed.
1907) (1836).
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that he was most especially concerned for propertied minorities among the
people." For that reason, Madison held that "the senate ought to come from and
represent the wealth of the nation," the "more capable sett of men," and that
other constraints on democratic rule should be instituted. In the Madisonian
Virginia Plan, the upper house was to "assure continuing protection for the
rights of the minority and other public goods," Banning comments. But in
practice, it is the rights of a specific minority that are to be protected, even to
be considered a "public good": the propertied minority of the opulent.
Madison's commitment to the primacy of property rights, which was
established in the constitutional system, is clear even in the statements adduced
to show that he "differed most profoundly from some others at the meeting"
by according "the people's right to rule" the same importance as "the protection
of the rights of property" (Banning). To illustrate, Banning notes that
throughout his life Madison kept to his maxim that "in a just and a free
government the rights both of property and of persons ought to be effectually
guarded." The formulation is misleading, however. There are no "rights of
property," only rights to property, which are rights of persons standing
alongside other rights (to freedom of speech, etc.). The right to property also
differs from others in that one person's possession of property deprives another
of that right. The Madisonian principle, then, holds in effect that a just and free
government should guard the rights of persons generally, but must provide
special and additional guarantees for the rights of one class of persons,
property owners, thus protecting the minority of the opulent against the
majority.
The threat of democracy took on still larger proportions because of the likely
increase in "the proportion of those who will labor under all the hardships of
life, and secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings," which
Madison anticipated in a June 1787 speech. Perhaps influenced by Shay's
rebellion, he went on to warn that "the equal laws of suffrage" might in time
shift power into their hands. "No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this
Country," he added, 'but symptoms of a levelling spirit.., have sufficiently
appeared in a certain quarters [sic] to give warning of the future danger. The
poor, in short, might turn to their historical vocation of "plundering the rich,"
which was later to impede U.S. efforts in "developing controls over the minds
and emotions of unsophisticated peoples."48
The basic problem that Madison foresaw in "framing a system which we
wish to last for ages" was to ensure that the actual rulers will be the opulent
minority so as "to secure the rights of property [meaning the privileged
personal right to property] agst the danger from an equality of universality of
suffrage, vesting compleate power over property in hands without a share in
it." Those "without property, or the hope of acquiring it," he reflected in 1829,
"cannot be expected to sympathize sufficiently with its rights, to be safe
depositories of power over them." The solution was to ensure that society be
48 Supra note 36.
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fragmented, with limited public participation in the political arena, which is to
be effectively in the hands of the wealthy and their agents. Lance Banning, who
among modem Madisonian scholars most strongly affirms Madison's
dedication to popular rule, nevertheless agrees with Gordon Wood that "[t]he
Constitution was intrinsically an aristocratic document designed to check the
democratic tendencies of the period," delivering power to a "better sort" of
people and excluding "those who were not rich, well born, or prominent from
exercising political power.
'49
The modem version I have already sampled, though keeping to the liberal
side of the spectrum, omitting the reactionary variant, labelled "conservative,"
with its call for strengthening "community" and "civil society"-understood
narrowly, however. Participation in civil society means having a job, going to
church to be encouraged to have "higher thoughts than labor agitation," as John
D. Rockefeller's favorite evangelist put it a century ago,50 and otherwise
keeping busy well removed from the public arena, which is to be in the hands
of the rich and powerful. The latter, furthermore, are to remain invisible, for
good reasons. "The architects of power in the United States must create a force
that can be felt but not seen," Samuel Huntington observed while explaining
the need to delude the public about the Soviet threat: "Power remains strong
when it remains in the dark; exposed to the sunlight it begins to evaporate."
51
This account of the Madisonian roots of the prevailing concepts of
democracy is unfair in an important respect. Like Adam Smith and other
founders of classical liberalism, Madison was pre-capitalist, and hardly in
sympathy with "the New Spirit of the Age: Gain Wealth, forgetting all but Self,"
which signalled the defeat of the revolution to working people in New England
not long after his death. Madison "was-to depths that we today are barely able
to imagine-an eighteenth century gentleman of honor," Banning comments.
It is the "enlightened Statesman" and "benevolent philosopher" who, he hoped,
are to share in the exercise of power. Ideally "pure and noble," these "men of
intelligence, patriotism, property and independent circumstances" would be a
"chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of
their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." They would thus "refine"
and "enlarge" the "public views," guarding the public interest against the
"mischiefs" of democratic majorities.
4 9 GORDON WOOD, CREATIONOFTHE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 513-14 (1969). Wood's thesis
is that the enterprise failed and that the "democratic society" that emerged "was not the
society the revolutionary leaders had wanted or expected," grounded in republican
virtues and enlightment. WOOD, supra note 44, at 365. Whether the failure of
republicanism led to a triumph of democracy, however, depends very much on how
we understand the latter concept, and the events that followed. Many, including even
much of the white working class, had a different picture.
50GERALD COLBY AND CHARLOTTE DENNETT, THY WILL BE DONE 15 (1995).
5 1 SIDNEY PLOTKIN & WILLIAM SCHEURMAN, PRIVATE INTERESTS, PUBLIC SPENDING 223
(1994).
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Madison soon learned differently, as the "opulent minority" proceeded to use
their new-found power much as Adam Smith had described, pursuing their
"vile maxim": "All for ourselves, and nothing for other people." By 1792,
Madison warned that the Hamiltonian developmental capitalist state would
be a government "substituting the motive of private interest in place of public
duty," leading to "a real domination of the few under an apparent liberty of the
many." Afew months earlier, in a letter to Jefferson, he had deplored "the daring
depravity of the times," as the "stockjobbers will become the pretorian band of
the government-at once its tools and its tyrant; bribed by its largesses, and
overawing it by clamors and combinations." They will cast over society the
shadow that we call "politics," as John Dewey later formulated another truism
that dates back to Adam Smith.
There have been many changes in the past 200 years, but Madison's words
of warning remain apt, taking new meaning with the establishment of huge,
largely unaccountable private tyrannies-Jefferson's '"banking institutions and
moneyed incorporations"-which were granted extraordinary powers early in
this century. They mimic totalitarian forms in their internal structure, receive
ample "largesses" from the states they largely dominate, and have gained
substantial control over the domestic and international economy as well as the
informational and doctrinal systems, bringing to mind another of Madison's
concerns: that "[a] popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps
both."
With these realities in the not very obscure background, any discussion of
the successes of market democracy is of limited real world relevance. With
regard to democracy, the point seems clear enough to most of the population,
however well or poorly they may comprehend the workings of the forces that
"can be felt but not seen." As for markets, this is not the place to undertake a
serious analysis, but surely talk of markets and trade is misleading at best when
"over 50 percent of the international trade of both the United States and Japan
and 80 percent of British manufactured exports" are "intrafirm rather than
international,"52 guided by a very visible hand, with all sorts of devices for
evading market discipline. And it is surely misleading to speak of "lean and
mean times" when the business press cannot find adjectives exuberant enough
to capture the "dazzling" and "stupendous" profit growth of the 1990s, and a
headline in Business Week announces "The Problem Now: What to do with All
that Cash," as "surging profits" are "overflowing the coffers of Corporate
America" and dividends are booming. Or to discuss the suffering caused across
the board by "downsizing" when the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that
the category of "executives, managers, and administrative personnel" for U.S.
companies grew almost 30 percent from 1983 to 1993, 53 while compensation
52 Vincent Cable, The Diminished Nation-State, 124 DAEDALUS Mar. 22, 1995 (citing the
U.N. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT (1993)).
53 Robert Hayes, U.S. Competitiveness: 'Resurgence' versus Reality, CHALLENGE,
March/April 1996, at 36-44. On the "bloated, top-heavy managerial and supervisory
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for executives skyrocketed (and easily retains its international lead, relative to
labor costs)-apparently with little or no correlation to performance.54
Similarly, some caution seems necessary in lauding the marvels of the
"emerging markets" when the leading recipient of U.S. Foreign Direct
Investment in the hemisphere (Canada aside) is Bermuda, with about
one-quarter, another 20% going to other tax havens, much of the rest to such
"economic miracles" as Mexico, which followed the dictates of the "Washington
consensus" with unusual obedience, and less than glorious consequences for
the overwhelming majority.55
In fact, the very notions of "capitalism" and "markets" seem to be
disappearing from consciousness, much like the concept of democracy. A few
examples may serve to illustrate.
A lead story in the Wall Street Journal, discussing the "fateful choices" that
states are making to attract business, compares two cases: Maryland, with its
"antibusiness image," and "more Republican" Virginia, which is "more gung-ho
about corporate growth" and more sympathetic to "the choices made by
entrepreneurs." Why these two examples? In fact, the actual case studied is not
Maryland and Virginia, but the Greater Washington region, one of the "top
areas in the U.S. for high-tech, emerging-growth companies." The Washington
suburbs did follow different business strategies: in Maryland, they relied on
the "powerful economic engine" provided by federal spending in medicine,
pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology, while Virginia put its faith in the
traditional cash cow, the Pentagon system. With a "stroke of luck," Virginia's
more conservative values turned out to have been the wiser choice:
entrepreneurs banking on the "the death sciences" are doing better than those
who thought "the life sciences" would provide more public funding, a senior
fellow at George Mason University observes. "Virginia has emerged
triumphant," the Journal reports, exploiting "the U.S. government's huge
budgets for computer systems and networks," communications and
information technology, and military procurement, thereby constructing "one
of the largest concentrations in America" of high tech companies. 56
The "choices made by entrepreneurs" reduce to which public funds will be
more lucrative, much as in the "Norman Rockwell world with fiber optic
computers and jet airplanes" described by its congressional representative
bureaucracies" of U.S. corporations (more than three times as high as Germany and
Japan), and the relation of "corporate bloat" to the (also unusual) U.S. "wage squeeze,"
see DAVID GORDON, FAT AND MEAN (1996).
54 Judith Dobrzyoski, Getting What They Deserve?: No Profit Is No Problem for High-Paid
Executives, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1996. For extensive data, see LAWRENCE MISHEL & JARED
BERNSTEIN, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA: 1994-95 (1994).
55U.S. Department of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT BusINEss 75.8, Aug. 1995, 97,
112.
56 Bemard Wysocki, Life and Death: Defense or Biotech? For Capital's Suburbs, Choices
Were Fatefid, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1995, at Al, A5.
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Newt Gingrich, where conservatism "flowers" by feeding at the public
trough.57
In Foreign Affairs, Dean Joseph Nye of Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government and Admiral William Owens argue that U.S. global power has
been underestimated. Washington's diplomacy has an unnoticed new "ability
to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs," a "force multiplier"
resulting from "the attraction of American democracy and free markets"; more
specifically, resulting from "Cold War investments" that enabled U.S. industry
to dominate "important communications and information processing
technologies. 58 Huge subsidies extracted from the public under the guise of
"security" are thus a tribute to democracy and free markets.
Boston international lawyer Larry Schwartz elaborates: "a preeminent
group of free-market scholars," he writes, has concluded that Silicon Valley and
Route 128 in Boston may illustrate the best way "to implement market
principles in former communist economies," with their "interactive system of
venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, skilled labor, universities, support service
and entrepreneurial and supplier networks"-and public subsidies that are
somehow missing from the picture, perhaps simply taken for granted as a
crucial feature of "free enterprise."59
Joining those who are concerned about the "unprecedented redistribution of
income toward the rich," John Cassidy, in an informative report on the
tribulations of the "middle class," concludes that "this is nobody's fault; it is just
how capitalism has developed." It is what "the free market has decided, in its
infinite but mysterious wisdom," and "politicians will eventually have to wake
up and accept the fact," abandoning the pretense that something can be done
about such natural phenomena. His study mentions three corporations:
McDonnell Douglas, Grumman, and Hughes Aircraft, each of them as
inspiring a tribute to the infinite and mysterious wisdom of the market as
Clinton's choice to illustrate his "grand vision" of the free market future at the
Seattle APEC summit (Boeing), or Gingrich's favorite (Lockheed-Martin), or
the corporation "which retained its No. 1 spot as America's most valuable
company" in Business Week's "top 1000" listing for 1995 (General Electric), to
mention just a few.60
The United States, of course, is not alone in its conceptions of economic
liberalism, even if its ideologues perhaps lead the chorus. The doubling of the
gap between countries of the top and bottom quintiles from 1960 is
57 Peter Applebome, A Suburban Eden where the Right Rules, with Conservatism
Flowering Among the Malls, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1994.
58 Joseph S. Nye & William A. Owens, America's Information Edge, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
March/April 1966, at 20.
59 Schwartz, Route 128 May be the Road toa Free-market Economy, BOSTON GLOBE, March
22, 1996, at 23, adapted from Venture Abroad, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 15-18 Nov./Dec. 1994,
adding Boston's Route 128.
60John Cassidy, Who Killed the Middle Class?, NEw YORKER, Oct. 16, 1995, at 113-24.
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substantially attributable to protectionist measures of the rich, the U.N.
Development Program Report concluded in 1992. The practices persist through
the Uruguay Round, the 1994 Report observes, concluding that "the industrial
countries, by violating the principles of free trade, are costing the developing
countries an estimated $50 billion a year-nearly equal to the total flow of
foreign assistance"-much of it publicly-subsidized export promotion.
Looking at the matter from the standpoint of leading ("core") firms rather
than states, a careful recent study found that: "Virtually all of the world's
largest core firms have experienced a decisive influence from government
policies and/or trade barriers on their strategy and competitive position."
"There has never been a 'level playing field' in international competition," the
study realistically concludes, "and it is doubtful whether there ever will be one."
Government intervention, which has "been the rule rather than the exception
over the past two centuries, ... has played a key role in the development and
diffusion of many product and process innovations-particularly in aerospace,
electronics, modern agriculture, materials technologies, energy and
transportation technology," as well as telecommunications and information
technologies generally, and in earlier days, textiles and steel. Quite generally,
"(supra)national government policies, in particular defence programmes, have
been an overwhelming force in shaping the strategies and competitiveness of
the world's largest firms." In fact, "at least twenty companies in the 1993
Fortune 100 would not have survived at all as independent companies, if they
had not been saved by their respective governments," by socializing losses or
simple state takeover "during major restructuring periods." One is the leading
employer in Gingrich's deeply conservative district, Lockheed, saved from
collapse by $2 billion federal loan guarantees provided by the Nixon
administration.6 1
It is important to stress that none of this is novel. Centuries ago, England
was preaching the wonders of markets to India while despoiling it and
massively protecting its own industry and commerce, the course followed by
its former American colonies as soon as they were free to pursue an
independent path, as did others who were able to make relatively independent
choices. And "the men of best quality" and "responsible men" have rarely
wavered from their vocation, from the earliest days of recorded history.
Nonetheless, with all the sordid continuities, an optimistic soul
can-realistically I think-discern slow progress, and there is no more reason
now than there has ever been to believe that we are constrained by mysterious
and unknown social laws, not simply decisions made within institutions that
are subject to human will.
6 1 WINFRIED RUIGROCK & ROB VAN TULDER, THE LoGic OF INTERNATIONAL
RESTRUCTURING 217,221-22 (1995).
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